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The United States has been the most powerful country in the world since the Second 
World War. In the wake of September 11, at a time when the US has an unrivalled 
ability to project power in any part of the globe, this may seem like a remarkably 
anodyne observation. Yet it is important to remember that for much of the post-war 
period the Soviet Union was a formidable adversary that constrained American 
influence and provided an alternative vision of the way the world might be ordered. 
We now know, of course, that the Soviet system was incapable of supporting either its 
military pretensions or the aspirations of much of its citizenry, but this should not 
blind us to the fact that for many years ideological rivalry and super-power 
confrontation were the seemingly immutable realities of the post-war order. In the 
wake of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, and despite periodic concerns about the 
performance of the US’s own economy, America has emerged as the sole-superpower 
and the cornerstone of what is routinely depicted as a unipolar inter-state system 
(Wohlforth 1999).  
 
Over the last 50 years or so, therefore, American power has waxed, waned and waxed 
again. This is interesting enough in itself, but from the perspective of Southeast Asia 
it is especially important because the changing nature of America’s global ambitions 
and its capacity to achieve them has coincided with a critical phase of nation-building 
and economic development across Southeast Asia. The intention of this chapter is to 
examine the impact that the US has had on Southeast Asia’s historical development, 
both during the Cold War period when the emergent states of the region attempted to  
consolidate and assert their independence, and more recently, when the combined 
effects of economic fragility and the emergence of new strategic challenges have 
provided a painful reminder of just how susceptible the region remains to powerful 
external forces over which it has limited influence (Beeson 2002).  
 
To understand why Southeast Asia continues to be profoundly affected by a variety of 
influences that emanate from outside the region, and by the actions of the US in 
particular, it is important to say something about the post-war order American power 
helped create. As we shall see, ‘American hegemony’ has changed in ways that reflect 
the US’s own shifting foreign policy priorities, which were themselves products of 
long-term geo-political change in the international system. The first section of this 
chapter consequently describes this emergent order and provides a theoretical 
understanding of the changes and continuities that characterise it. Following this, I 
consider the distinct – though fundamentally  interconnected – strategic and economic 
elements of American power and analyse their impact on Southeast Asia. Finally, I 
consider the prospects for  America’s relations with Southeast Asia in the light of both 
the US’s ‘war on terror’, and as a consequence of the wider East Asian region’s 
attempts to develop a more formally constituted regional identity and organisational 
presence. 
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American hegemony 
 
‘Hegemony’ used to be a term primarily associated with scholars working within a 
broadly Marxist or radical tradition. These days, it’s used across a broad political and 
scholarly spectrum to describe the unparalleled dominance of the US (see Beeson and 
Berger 2003). Although there continuing grounds for concern about the health of both 
the American and global economies (see Brenner 2001), there is no doubt that the US 
economy experienced something of a renaissance in the second half of the 1990s; a 
recovery that not only seemed to refute some of the more pessimistic claims about 
American decline that were widespread a decade earlier,1 but which effectively 
underpinned America’s growing military dominance. One of the most striking aspects 
of America’s contemporary strategic primacy is that it is achieved with remarkably 
little economic effort or cost (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002). Consequently, no other 
country – certainly not the former Soviet Union, nor even a rapidly emerging China – 
can rival America’s overwhelming strategic dominance. Crucial as this military might 
is to America’s pre-eminent position, it is not the whole story: part of what makes 
America hegemonic is its capacity to shape the rules and regulations that constitute 
the contemporary international system. In short, although recent events remind us that 
the US has the ability to compel compliance with its wishes, it is the willingness of 
other nations to accede to, and even support, American power and the distinctive 
ideas and values associated with it that is such a distinctive and telling aspect of its 
hegemonic dominance. To understand how America came to occupy this unique and 
privileged position it is useful to make a few brief theoretical and historical 
observations. 
 
One of the most influential and sophisticated attempts to explain the emergence and 
decline of particular countries and their dominance of the international system has 
been developed by Immanuel Wallerstein in particular and by ‘world system 
theorists’ more generally (see Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995). In essence, this 
formulation claims that the rise to prominence of a particular power reflects long-run 
cyclical change in an increasingly global capitalist economy. This model suggests that 
powers rise and fall partly as a consequence of their economic position: technological 
innovation in ‘leading sectors’ of the economy underpins the rise of new hegemonic 
powers and undercuts existing ones (Schwarz 2000). The other key point to note 
about this depiction of global capitalism and the role of hegemonic power is that the 
world is characterised by ‘structured inequality’, in which a distinct ‘core’ of 
politically and economically powerful, industrialised, wealthy countries, 
systematically exploits and renders dependent a ‘periphery’ of developing economies 
(see Chase-Dunn 1998). Although economic development in parts of East and 
Southeast Asia has tended to undermine such a sweeping and static depiction of 
international economic relations, much of the developed world plainly does enjoy the 
advantages that flow from industrialising early.  One of the increasingly loudly heard 
complaints in parts of Southeast Asia in particular, is that the contemporary 
international  political-economy perpetuates such inequalities by discriminating 
against ‘late’ developing states (see Hewison 2001). In such circumstances, one of the 
key challenges for the hegemonic power of the era is to win support for, or minimise 
opposition to, its preferred vision of international order. 
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Unfortunately, there have been a limited number of historical examples with which to 
examine either the rise and fall of hegemonic powers, or the strategies they have 
employed to maintain their ascendancy. In any case, we now inhabit a world in which 
‘global’ forces and transnational institutions have assumed an unparalleled 
importance, raising questions about how relevant earlier historical experiences 
actually are, and leading some scholars to claim that in the contemporary period 
power is far more ‘de-centred’ and diffuse than before (Hardt and Negri 2000). 
Nevertheless, the examples of British hegemony in the nineteenth century and 
American hegemony today, do strongly suggest that if the leading power of the day is 
both economically and strategically paramount it will have the capacity, or at least the 
desire, to establish 
 
universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of 
behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national 
boundaries – rules which support the dominant mode of production (Cox 1983: 172). 
 
While there may be debate about how universal and uncontested some of these norms 
and values are, there is no doubt that America has played a crucial role in establishing 
and maintaining a particular sort of world order, one associated with liberal values 
and the promotion of an ‘open’, capitalist economic order (Latham 1997). The 
creation, primarily under US auspices, of the so-called Bretton Woods institutions – 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade – in the aftermath of the Second World War, confirmed America’s status as 
the dominant power of the era. Although the roles of these institutions have changed 
in important ways, the US retains a major influence over their activities – a 
circumstance that has had major implications for Southeast Asia, as we shall see when 
we consider the recent economic crisis that gripped the region. Consequently, even if 
there is less than complete enthusiasm on the part of Southeast Asian elites about the 
precise nature of the ‘neoliberal’ or market-centred order that American hegemony 
has assiduously tried to promote,2 there may be little alternative other than to comply 
with its overall direction.  
 
The possibilities for either effective resistance or the promotion of indigenous 
alternatives to the dominant paradigm appear to have been further foreclosed by 
recent strategic developments and the ‘war on terrorism’. Interestingly enough, 
however, the prospect of conflict and warfare have, for some Southeast Asian 
countries, at least, provided opportunities for economic development and limited 
autonomy: evolving American priorities and shifting geo-political imperatives have 
profoundly shaped Southeast Asia’s political and economic possibilities. To see why, 
we need to examine America’s strategic engagement with the broader East Asian 
region and with Southeast Asia in particular. 
 
America, the Cold War, and Southeast Asia 
 
America’s involvement in Southeast during the Cold War provides an illuminating 
counterpoint to the contemporary period where the ‘war on terror’ has seen the region 
assume a renewed prominence in US strategic thinking. Despite the importance of 
strategic concerns in both periods, however, there are significant differences which 
help to explain the quite different dynamics that have shaped political and economic 
outcomes. Somewhat paradoxically the Cold War period provided – for some 
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Southeast Asian countries, at least – both a spur to economic and political 
development, and a surprising degree of autonomy. As we shall see in the final 
section, a very different set of dynamics obtains in the region now. 
 
The first point to make about America’s immediate post-war involvement in 
Southeast Asia is that the region was initially a relatively minor part of the wider 
struggle against the perceived threat of communist expansion (Zhao 1998). Although 
America had emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful country on 
the planet, it was confronted by what looked to be a formidable and implacably 
opposed ideological opponent – the Soviet Union – which had already expanded its 
own empire throughout Eastern Europe. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Europe was the 
main game as far as containment of possible communist expansion was concerned. It 
took the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 to push East Asia to the forefront of 
American security concerns and place the Manichean struggle between capitalism and 
communism on a global footing; a contest in which the region would play a pivotal 
and bloody part (see Yahuda 1996). 
 
As far as Southeast Asia was concerned, the Americans had to rapidly expand the 
extent of their engagement with the region, which had hitherto been principally 
confined to administering its colony in the Philippines. For some Southeast Asian 
nations America’s preoccupation with the wider Cold War confrontation and its 
capacity to lean on the region’s former colonial powers meant that their independence 
aspirations received an important fillip. The independence movement in Indonesia, for 
example, received crucial American support when the US pressured the Dutch to 
withdraw in the hope that an independent, pro-Western capitalist democracy would 
ultimately emerge (Tarling 1998). In the changed intellectual environment in which 
colonialism became harder to defend strategically or morally, the Philippines, Burma, 
and Malaya either gained independence, or made important moves toward it 
(Stockwell 1999). Other countries, of course were not so fortunate: in Vietnam, 
despite independence leader Ho Chi Minh’s personal affinity with American political 
ideals, the independence movement’s association with communism placed Vietnam 
on a collision course with America that would – following France’s expulsion - 
ultimately culminate in the Vietnam War (see Kolko 1997). 
 
For those countries outside Indochina, however, which were fortunate enough to find 
themselves allied to America, the Cold War brought a number of direct benefits, 
beyond accelerating the decolonisation process. America’s overarching strategic 
vision, which was predicated on establishing successful, pro-western capitalist 
economies to stand as a bulwark against communist expansion, led them to pour aid 
and investment into East Asia. Two aspects of the surprisingly beneficial impact that 
war had on some of the Southeast Asian countries are worth highlighting. First, 
American support for Japan in particular meant that Japan played a key role as a 
successful, industrialised Asian economy; something that meant it would in turn 
become a source of further investment in Southeast Asia.3 The second point to make 
is that, without American economic support for the region, both in the form of aid and 
investment and – crucially – in the form of a huge North American consumer goods 
market - development would have been a good deal slower, and the export-oriented 
strategies that characterised economic expansion across the region would have been 
much more difficult to sustain (see Stubbs 1999). 
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The other general point to make briefly about the effect of America’s Cold War 
activities is about its impact on Southeast Asia as a region and the development of 
regional institutions as a consequence. At one level, it is plain that the US’s 
preference for bilateral as opposed to multilateral strategic ties, and the consequent 
establishment of a ‘hub and spokes’ security architecture across East Asia did little to 
promote contact – either political or economic – within the wider region (Cumings 
1997). The Cold War had the effect of fundamentally dividing both East and 
Southeast Asia along ideological lines, making the development of the sort of 
regionally-oriented initiatives that have characterised other parts of the world 
inherently problematic. However, the Cold War generally, and America’s influence in 
particular, have had the - not always intentional effect - of actually promoting greater 
regional institutionalisation amongst the non-communist powers. The establishment 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is, perhaps, the most 
important example of this possibility. Although there were compelling reasons to 
develop an institution with the capacity to manage intramural tensions within 
Southeast Asia, such considerations were overlaid and given critical impetus by 
evolving Great Power rivalries across the region. The mutual desire to protect 
sovereignty and create an entity capable of playing a larger role in a region dominated 
by the geo-political rivalries of the external powers4 had the effect, Acharya (2001: 
202) argues, of creating a sense of regional identity where none existed previously. 
 
Systematic attempts are being made to cultivate this sense of regional identity across 
the wider East Asian region; it could conceivably present a significant buffer to 
American power if it achieves the hopes of its supporters. Before considering this in 
any detail, however, it is important to highlight how and why America might wish to 
assert its influence, and why much of the region might wish to resist it.  
 
America and Southeast Asian political-economy 
 
American priorities have been central determinants of, and constraints on, political 
and economic development in the region. Consciously or unconsciously, American 
power during the Cold War in particular structured the environment within which the 
less powerful Southeast Asian countries attempted to come to terms with the multiple 
challenges of decolonisation, nation-building and economic development. 
Significantly, however, America’s preoccupation with grand strategy and the struggle 
with communism meant that American foreign policy elites were prepared to either 
actively support - or at least tolerate - regimes which may not even have paid lip 
service to the principles, much less practiced, the sorts of values which were central to 
the declaratory agenda of American-inspired liberalism. This contradiction was most 
evident during the Marcos era in the Philippines, where a repressive, illiberal and 
hopelessly corrupt regime was sustained for many years with the aid of America 
itself,  and through multilateral agencies like the World Bank, over which the US 
wielded enormous influence (Hutchcroft 1998). Not only was America  prepared to 
tolerate the flagrant abuse of its political principles in the Philippines, it also adopted 
a similarly benign view of the sorts of strategies and policies that were adopted to 
boost economic development in Southeast Asia. 
 
There is no intention here of attempting to describe the Southeast Asian development 
experience in any detail, as other contributions to this collection address such issues in 
some detail (see Felker, this volume?). However, it is important to highlight a few 
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issues as they help to explain the dynamics that drive the, occasionally fractious, 
relationship the US has with a number of Southeast Asian countries. In this regard, a 
number of historical factors are crucial. The impact of the Cold War generally, and 
the way American policies helped foster economic take-off in Northeast Asia in 
particular, have already been noted. But what should also be stressed is that, with the 
noteworthy exception of Singapore,5 the Southeast Asian economies had to cope with 
the challenges of ‘late’ development, made more problematic by the very success of 
the earlier economic expansion in Japan and its Northeast Asian acolytes, Korea and 
Taiwan. In such circumstances, the sorts of ‘interventionist’, state-led development 
strategies that were pioneered by Japan - but which have come in for such sustained 
criticism from the US and other champions of neoliberal policies (Schoppa 1997) -  
offered a way for the governments of some Southeast Asian countries to accelerate 
the industrialisation process and move up the regional economic pecking order. 
Although the picture across the region is mixed, with Indochina and the Philippines 
being noteworthy laggards, in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, at least, ‘there is 
little doubt that the structural transformation and industrialization of these economies 
have gone well beyond what would have been achieved by relying exclusively on 
market forces and private sector initiatives’ (Jomo 2001a: 481). 
 
Importantly, however, it was not just the fact that state-led industrialisation strategies 
were attractive to Southeast Asian political elites and technocrats that put them on a 
potential collision course with America and the increasingly influential, pro-market 
inter-governmental organisations over which it exercised such influence. Resistance 
to the ideational aspects of American hegemony was almost inevitable given that the 
sorts of reforms championed by the US and its institutional handmaidens were 
directly threatening to existent patterns of power, interest and social accommodation 
across the region. As Jomo (2001b) reminds us, ‘much state intervention in Southeast 
Asia has mainly been for redistributive ends, mainly at the behest of politically 
influential business interests and interethnic redistribution’. Malaysia is the most 
complete example of a society in which economic development strategies have been 
used to underpin a complex array of policies designed to achieve specific economic 
and social outcomes. Malaysia also highlights the way in which the disparate 
developmental goals can lead to a fusion of political and economic power and the 
entrenchment of existent elites (Gomez and Jomo 1997). Whatever we may think of 
such regimes, from the perspective of many observers in the region, American policy, 
and the policies of associated institutions like the WTO, were intended to foreclose 
potentially  critical developmental mechanisms and entrench the position of the rich, 
industrialised economies (Khor 2000; Mahathir 1999).  
 
It is also important to recognise, as Kanishka Jayasuriya  (2001) has persuasively 
argued, that during the Cold War period, and even up until the economic crisis of 
1997, the distinctive combination of economic and security polices that characterised 
US policy in Southeast Asia was predicated on, and actually facilitated, a specific 
pattern of political and economic relationships across the region. What Jayasuriya 
describes as ‘embedded mercantilism’ refers to the development of domestic political 
coalitions that managed the relationship between the tradeable and non-tradeable 
sectors of the economy, allowing trade-offs to be made between those sectors of the 
economy that could compete in world markets and those that could not and needed 
protection. Crucially, this essentially political response to the challenge of 
international structural  adjustment also established the preconditions for the sort of 
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patronage-based political structures that are so characteristic of Southeast Asia. As 
Jayasuriya observes, there are parallels here with Ruggie’s (1983) celebrated concept 
of ‘embedded liberalism’. The difference, of course, is that in the post-war period, the 
governments of Western Europe retained domestic autonomy within a broadly liberal 
international order. Embedded liberalism, in other words, was compatible with the 
overall goals of American hegemony. Embedded mercantilism, by contrast, is not.  
 
Another important comparative point that helps to explain why post-war American 
hegemony was tolerated, if not embraced by Europe, was that it was accompanied by 
a comprehensive – highly interventionist – plan for the rebuilding of Europe, in which 
massive injections of American capital played a critical role (see Lundestad 1986; 
Hogan 1987). In contemporary Southeast Asia, by contrast, which is arguably facing a 
similar nexus of developmental and security threats, similar largesse has not been 
forthcoming. On the contrary, American hegemony has been primarily associated 
with the continuing promotion of neoliberalism in general and of American financial 
sector interests in particular: long run changes in the structure of the increasingly 
interconnected international economy - especially the rise to prominence of 
international financial capital – have fundamentally reconfigured the environment 
within which individual governments must operate. Financial sector interests 
associated with ‘Wall Street’ now exert a powerful influence over  American 
domestic and foreign policy – a fact that explains the continuing promotion of 
financial sector liberalisation across the world despite compelling evidence about its 
dangers (Beeson forthcoming). The sorts of policy paradigms that underpinned post-
war reconstruction in Europe and the ‘golden age’ of  social welfare capitalism are 
consequently incompatible with the dominant interests that shape current American 
policy and values (Phillips 2002). 
 
It is, therefore, within this context of potentially incommensurate normative and 
policy paradigms that the US’s relationships with Southeast Asian nations need to be 
seen. Although there have always been disjunctures between the rhetoric and reality 
of American foreign and domestic policy (see, for example, Blum 2000), the telling 
point is that there is a clear desire within much of the American policy-making 
establishment to encourage particular sorts of behaviour in other parts of the world. 
Thus it is also revealing, especially about the nature of contemporary American 
hegemony, that the preferred vehicle for achieving such outcomes is either direct 
bilateral pressure in the security sphere, or through the auspices of powerful agencies 
like the IMF in the economic sphere. The high-profile role America played in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis demonstrated both its willingness to assume a 
much larger part in achieving its preferred outcomes in the region, and its preference 
for direct institutional intervention through agencies like the IMF to achieve such 
outcomes, rather than operating through multilateral agencies like the increasingly 
discredited Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (Beeson 1999). 
Crucially, it was the absence  of the strategic imperatives associated with the Cold 
War that gave America the chance to pursue narrower economic interests. 
 
At the very least, therefore, the US’s somewhat opportunistic behaviour in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis raised serious doubts about – mainly North American – 
scholarship which suggested that the role of American hegemony was fundamentally 
benign, and centred on the provision of crucial collective goods (see, for example, 
Kindleberger 1973). For others, recent American policy has either been the entirely 
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predictable behaviour of powerful states, or a desirable expression of American power 
and a central component of international order (Mearschiemer 2001). Recent events 
have reinforced this latter view amongst some scholars and, more importantly, within 
the American foreign policy making elite itself (Lieven 2002). Before considering the 
implications of this development in any detail, however, it is important to say 
something about the regional context within which American power will be manifest, 
for at this level there have been significance developments which may blunt the 
impact, or at least complicate the application of, American policy. 
 
America and East Asian regionalism 
 
Despite the consolidation of the hub and spoke network of bilateral relations across 
East Asia noted above, American political elites have long thought of East Asia and 
its place in the world in regional terms. American strategy under Bill Clinton, for 
example, was predicated on the notion of incorporating East Asia into a wider ‘Pacific 
Community’ (Tow 2001: 170). Whether such goals were ever realisable given the 
inherently artificial nature of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ is open to question (see Dirlik 1992), 
but the key point to stress here is that in East Asia itself there has been – until 
recently, at least – very little enthusiasm for this sort of grand community building. 
What is noteworthy of late – especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis – is 
that there is a growing enthusiasm for precisely such an endeavour, albeit with a 
limited East Asian membership. If this trend consolidates, it could represent a 
significant check to American influence in the region. 
 
The possibility that the development of more effective regionally-based institutions 
might undermine American influence in the region has long-been recognised by the 
US and demonstrated in its opposition to Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamed 
Mahathir’s proposed East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) (Hook 1999). Initially 
envisaged as an ‘Asians only’ grouping within the wider APEC forum, American 
hostility to the concept meant that it was effectively still-born; Japan’s continuing 
deference to the US and its consequent unwillingness to assume policy positions of 
which the latter disapproved assured EAEC’s non-viability. In the wake of the Asian 
economic crisis, however, the idea of an East Asian grouping has been revived. 
Although the US was able to scupper the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) - 
which Japan proposed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis - such ideas have not 
disappeared and continue to provide the basis for regionally-based strategies to 
counter future economic crises (Narine 2001). Indeed, it is significant that the formal 
expression of these regional initiatives – ASEAN+3, which includes the ASEAN 
nations, plus China, Japan, and South Korea – has developed increased momentum 
since the late 1990s (Stubbs 2002). 
 
Given ASEAN’s modest track-record of achievement as far as encouraging significant 
regional cooperation is concerned, there is a good deal of scepticism about how 
effective a larger organisation might in driving initiatives like an AMF or an East 
Asian preferential free trade agreement (Ravenhill 2002). The sceptics have a point: 
not only are there enduring tensions within the smaller ASEAN grouping (Tan 2000), 
but the two regional giants – Japan and China – have a history of animosity made 
worse by their inherently antagonistic regional leadership ambitions. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that Japan and China are making progress on some of the more 
mundane but symbolically important aspects of regional economic cooperation 
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(Sevastopulo 2002),  which could lay the groundwork for more extensive political 
cooperation.6 The emergence of greater regional cooperation in other parts of the 
world is likely to act as a spur to such developments and suggests that regionalism 
remains an important contemporary trend across the globe (Fawcett 1995). Yet 
whatever the long-term fate of these initiatives may be, the point of greatest 
significance here is that, in the case of East Asia at least, they are ‘aimed at restoring 
to Asia a greater degree of political power and autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, and the US and the international financial institutions in particular’ (Bowles 
2002: 245). In other words, as Webber (2001) argues, ‘the new East Asian 
regionalism is taking place in effect in opposition to the West in general and the US in 
particular’ (Webber 2001: 364, emphasis added). 
 
What is most striking about recent American policy toward East Asia, therefore, is 
that US economic – and by extension, political – goals have been encouraging the 
development of greater regionalism, or the self-conscious pursuit of greater political 
and institutional integration at the regional level. The unintended outcome of the 
application of American power has been to encourage a sort of ‘defensive 
regionalism’ in response to the common challenge of US assertiveness and 
unilateralism.  
 
A number of scholars have rightly emphasised the primacy of regionalisation – or 
underlying, predominantly private sector or market-led forms of regional activity – in 
encouraging greater regional integration (Phillips 2003); this has certainly been the 
principal engine driving economic interconnectedness in East Asia (Ravenhill 1995). 
However, we also need to recognise that regionalism can be encouraged by political 
forces that emanate from outside of regions themselves – even when such forces were 
intended to achieve very different goals. Far from resulting in the inevitable 
consolidation of the sort of ‘open’ regionalism associated with the US’s market-
centred trade liberalisation agenda, therefore, externally-generated reformist pressure 
may actually be encouraging the development of discriminatory, regionally-based 
preferential trade agreements (New Straits Times 2001). 
 
In the area of economic reform and the consolidation of a neoliberal agenda in East 
Asia, therefore, the picture is mixed. In the financial sector, efforts to develop 
defensive currency swap mechanisms and doubts about the benefits of liberalisation 
notwithstanding, there is continuing momentum toward further liberalisation. In the 
trade sector, on the other hand, the push for universal liberalisation is giving way to 
bilateral trade deals. In the economic sphere, therefore, especially where there are 
powerful, entrenched economic interests associated with embedded mercantilism, 
there have been significant limits to American influence and a capacity to resist 
reformist pressure. However, the events of September 11 provided a powerful 
reminder that economic development does not occur in isolation. The key question 
now is whether the renewed importance of strategic issues and the pivotal role 
Southeast Asia has played in the evolving ‘war on terror’ will actually enhance 
American power and its overall  capacity to achieve its goals. 
 
Back to the Future:  Southeast Asia after September 11 
 
The primacy attached to strategic issues in the aftermath of September 11 and the Bali 
bombings can be seen as a case of ‘back to the future’. As the earlier consideration of 
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the Cold War period demonstrated, American engagement with the wider East Asian 
region has always been primarily driven by security considerations. True, when the 
East Asian economies were booming and threatening to undermine America’s own 
domestic economy as a consequence, and when the declining significance of military 
threats led to a widespread privileging of economic rather than strategic issues, it 
looked as if a permanent recalibration of America’s foreign policy goals had occurred 
(Luttwak 1990). As the ‘war on terror’ continues to unfold, however, and as Southeast 
Asia in particular is pressured to play a suitably supportive part, such assumptions 
look increasingly untenable. This is not to argue that there was only one possible 
reaction to the attacks on America itself, but to suggest that the general strategic 
orientation of the Bush administration in particular made a mainly military response 
all too predictable (Lieven 2002).  
 
The re-emergence of security as a key issue has highlighted some of the tensions and 
contradictions in the pursuit of greater East Asian regionalism, the position of 
Southeast Asia in particular, and the ambiguous impact of American power. Although 
the actions of the US in the aftermath of Asia’s economic crisis were an inadvertent 
spur to greater regionalism, the ‘war on terror’ has provided a powerful reminder of 
the strategic fault-lines that have helped shape the region in the post-war period. For 
all the resentment that America’s heavy-handed intervention in the economic sphere 
generated, it is important to recognise that for most East Asian nations – China is the 
obvious exception - America’s strategic engagement is seen as a vital and 
irreplaceable component of regional stability (Christensen 1999). Consequently, 
despite the moves toward greater regional cooperation noted above, and the 
development of specific multilateral security organisations like the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the US’s continuing strategic dominance of the region means that there 
are major constraints on the possible development of regionally-based initiatives 
(Hara 1999). This was true even before September 11; recent events have had the 
effect of entrenching this reality. 
 
As far the countries of Southeast Asia are concerned, therefore, recent developments 
have highlighted their continuing susceptibility to external pressures. This was also 
the case during the Cold War, of course, but the overarching struggle between 
formidable capitalist and communist powers created a space within which the nations 
of Southeast Asia could at least attempt to shore up their sovereignty and concentrate 
on domestic security. In the post-Cold War environment the capacity of the ASEAN 
countries to influence regional security outcomes has diminished along with their 
strategic significance (Narine 1998). Moreover, in the longer term the perception of 
regional instability that emerged in the aftermath of the economic crisis has been 
given further weight by Southeast Asia’s association with Islamic separatism (Chalk 
2001). In such circumstances, the US has moved rapidly to consolidate or re-establish 
close, bilateral security relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and even Malaysia 
(Lyall 2002). ASEAN, as was the case during the Asian economic crisis, has found it 
difficult to assert itself and play a significant role in responding to a security challenge 
that threatens to further undermine the region’s fragile political and economic position 
(Callick 2002). 
 
Despite the fact that cooperation with the US in its self-proclaimed ‘war on terror’ is 
fraught with domestic difficulties for all of the major Southeast Asian nations 
(Richardson  2001), it is revealing that they all feel compelled to evince some degree 
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of cooperation, if not enthusiasm for the project. While for some countries, notably 
Malaysia, recent events presented an opportunity to engineer a welcome 
rapprochement with America, in the longer-term  Southeast Asia’s situation 
dramatically highlights a more general feature of contemporary American hegemony: 
the US’s insistence that other nations declare themselves ‘for or against’ terrorism - 
and by implication America’s foreign policy goals - combined with the US’s new 
doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ (Harding and Wolffe 2002),7 means that all nations must 
come to terms with an evermore powerful and unilateralist America.  Given that the 
so-called ‘axis of evil’ runs right through Northeast Asia, this is a situation with 
fundamentally destabilising implications for the entire East Asian region (Schorrock 
2002).  
 
September 11 may have been traumatic for the US,  but it threatens to inflict longer- 
term collateral damage on Southeast Asia. The presence of substantial Muslim 
populations across the region, especially when combined with credible evidence about 
terrorist activities  in parts of Southeast Asia (Abuza 2002), served to further dent the 
region’s battered post-crisis reputation. Indonesia is the most dramatic example of 
how perceptions of governmental ineptitude and  incapacity can exacerbate existing 
economic problems and cause a further decline in desperately needed foreign 
investment (McBeth 2002). Any illusions that ASEAN or even the ARF might play a 
pivotal role in managing the security crisis have been rapidly squashed by the US’s 
decisive, largely unilateral response, and the concomitant need for Asian nations to 
fall in line or risk incurring the wrath of the US or its institutional allies. American 
hegemony, in other words,  is once again proving to be a, if not the decisive 
determinant of Southeast Asia’s geopolitical future. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
America’s political influence, economic weight and – especially of late – its military 
might, have meant that there has always been a fundamental disparity in its power 
compared with Southeast Asia’s. Even in the most favourable of circumstances – 
paradoxically at the height of the Cold War – the combined efforts of the ASEAN 
nations were unable to significantly influence American policy. At best the nations of 
ASEAN have been able to opportunistically exploit moments of strategic 
preoccupation on the part of the US. It has become increasingly apparent, however, 
that – freed from its Cold War constraints – the US is prepared to use its 
overwhelming power to pursue what American foreign policy-making elites judge to 
be their national interests. In such circumstances, Southeast Asia can do little other 
than comply. 
 
Many Americans regard the US’s growing ascendancy as a good thing, and see 
American power and influence as sources of stability.  Despite the fact that its 
primacy is currently underpinned by conscious attempts to promote American norms 
and values (de Grazia 2002), however, across much of East Asia - and Latin America, 
too, for that matter (Higgott and Phillips 2000) – there is a substantial undercurrent of 
resentment about the impact of what are taken to be American-inspired initiatives and 
ideas. It is within such a context that recent attempts to develop a more authentically 
East Asian regional grouping need to be seen. Whether ASEAN + 3 can overcome 
significant internal tensions and formidable technical obstacles to provide an effective 
mechanisms for the development and promulgation of ‘Asian’ models of social, 
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political and economic organisation remains to be seen. Even if it is successful, it will 
be something of a mixed blessing for the countries of Southeast Asia as they will risk 
being overshadowed by the regional heavyweights. The stark reality for Southeast 
Asian nations  is that it they have a limited capacity  - alone or collectively - to control 
the external economic and strategic environment within which it must operate. In this 
regard, America is but the most compelling example of the constraints and challenges 
that face what are in many cases still developing economies and brittle political 
systems. 
 
Given that Southeast Asians have a limited capacity to shape the international system 
or influence the behaviour of its most powerful members, the outlook might seem 
rather bleak. In many ways it is: the regional security crisis that  emerged in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in American and Bali has added to instability and 
undermined economic development. However, if – and this is a very big ‘if’ – 
American foreign policymakers can be encouraged to take the sort of longer-term, 
visionary position that characterised American policy in post-war Europe at the dawn 
of the Cold War, then there may yet be grounds for cautious optimism. True, little that 
the current regime has done augurs well in this regard, but if American hegemony is 
to be more securely grounded then it plainly needs to gain the support of those who 
are drawn into its orbit. The big lesson to emerge from September 11 was that even 
the US with all its military might and political power is not immune to weapons of the 
weak when wielded by zealots. If Southeast Asia is not to become a breeding ground 
for such people, therefore, it is crucial that American hegemony becomes more 
consensual and less coercive.  
  
                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 See for example, Keohane (1984). 
2 On neoliberalism see Richardson (2001). 
3 Although there is some debate about the precise nature of Japan’s relationship with 
the region, the overall impact of Japan as a source of investment and as a role model 
for successful development has been positive and accelerated wider regional 
development. See Beeson (2001). 
4 It should be noted that although ASEAN has displayed remarkable longevity and 
played an important role in helping resolve regional crises, even where it played a 
prominent role in the resolution of the Cambodia crisis, this was largely because it 
coincided with the interests of the major powers. See, Jones and Smith (2001). 
5 Singapore industrialised earlier and more successfully than the rest of Southeast 
Asia and is integrated into the global economy in ways that make it an exceptional 
case in the region. 
6 It is worth emphasising that should the East Asian nations develop the requisite 
political will, they already have the economic capacity to underpin these sorts of 
economic initiatives and provide a degree of independence. See Dieter (2000). 
7 This policy is predicated upon the idea that the US reserves the right to unilaterally 
attack perceived enemies before they can threaten it. 
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